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I 
JURISDICTION 
I Ins - nil hit,1-, juri1 hi lion over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §78-2-
2(3)0) a n d Ru l e 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
1 1 . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are raistv i. - app. • 
1 '«; • 4 • . v o aipport the iurv's verdict that Appellees (the 
"Ivie Group") wu<* damaged in die amount of $250,000 by Appellant's ("Aspen Ridge") 
breach of the Option Agreement? The sliuuliiid on (hi:1; issue IN nlid1, iU»* un* "" verdict 
i'-i supported by siihslimlinl evidence. Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co . 7,)-+ I* ?d 
573, 577 n.J (Utah 1985) This issue was preserved below. [R. 1096 at i-i.-J-jv.. , K 
1096 at 73:14-7/..! | 
a. Did. HK," ili.slin ( court err in permitting Appellee Richard Bu\s ("Bins"*) to 
testify concerning the fair market value of Ioi 2 •'. Wolf Creek Kmk L : <ii J A . o-, ihc 
basis that he held a 15% ownership inleivsl K * thai buys 
Irslidul in hi* deposition he had no opinion on value and there was no inundation that 
Buys had any basis for his opinion of the fair market value of Ixit 27? This court reviews 
for correctness whether ttie disti -, pmpc r standard in permitting Buys to 
testify as a 15% owner of Lot 27. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82 at f l9 , 100 P.3d 1177. If 
the proper standard was utilized, the district court's decision to admit the testimony is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District v. Nelson, 358 P.2d 81, 84 (Utah 1960). This issue was preserved below. [R. 
1096 at 14:22-29:23 & 74:10-75:4] 
b. Did the district court err in permitting Buys to testify as to the fair market 
value of Lot 27 when Buys testified in his deposition that he had no opinion on value, and 
Appellees stated in their interrogatory answers that the value of Lot 27 was irrelevant to 
their damage theory and they had no opinion as to the fair market value of Lot 27, which 
interrogatory answer was never supplemented. The standard of review with respect to 
this issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion. American Interstate Mort. Corp. 
v. Edwards, 2002 UT App. 16, f 10, 41 P.3d 1142. Aspen Ridge preserved this issue 
below. [R. 1096 at 14:22-29:23] 
2. Did the district court err in awarding prejudgment interest when the fair market 
value of Lot 27 was not determined by the jury based upon appraisal testimony, but 
instead was determined based upon Buys's unsupported and wholly conclusory 
testimony? This issue is reviewed as a question of law on a correctness standard. James 
Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah App. 1994). This 
issue was preserved below. [R. 950] 
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III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE AND THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
BELOW. 
Appellant Aspen Ridge Ranches, L.L.C. ("Aspen Ridge") was the original 
developer of Wolf Creek Ranch, consisting of 84 lots containing 160 acres each in 
Wasatcn i. * u it> I he Appellees (hereii lafter collecti > 'el> i efei red to • ' I ' ie Gi 01 ip") 
o w n e c l 240 acres of raw land adjacent to Wolf Creek Ranch. On M;u ' 0, 2000, Aspen 
Ridge and the Ivie Group entered into two agreements The first agreement was an 
Lxchange Agreement pursuai it to w hlel I I < < ie exc :.»•'; * • cres foi ft ill} impi o v eel 
Lot 27 in Wolf Creek Ranch, Plat 2A. [Ex. 56] The second agreement was an Option 
Agreement pursuant to which Aspen Ridge obtained the option f<> repurchase I ot 27 from 
t.:. i \ ic i iroup on or befc n e IV !a> 10 , 2003 foi I he : i ;i lm < : >f $' 750,000 00 isj: >en R idge paid 
tiie ivie <inmp $150,000.00 for this option that was not to be applied to the purchase 
price. [Ex. 55] 
Pursuai it to paragi aph 6 ;: f the Option Agreement, if ' \ spen Ridge sold either I • : t 
46 or Lot 47 in Wolf Creek Ranch during the term of the option then Aspen Ridge was 
"obligated to exercise the Option with respect to the purchase of the Property within t1~:rty 
3 
(30) days following the closing . . . ." [Id] On June 1, 2001. Aspen Ridge sold Lot 46. 
Aspen Ridge did not exercise the option within 30 days of that sale, or at all. [R. 11] 
On or about March 14, 2003, the Ivie Group commenced this action, contending 
that Aspen Ridge had breached the Option Agreement by not purchasing Lot 27 within 30 
days after the sale of Lot 46. [R. 11] The Ivie Group sought damages "in the amount of at 
least $750,000 or as otherwise shown at trial." [R. 10] The Amended Complaint filed by 
the Ivie Group on March 18, 2003 contained that same prayer for relief. [R. 14-26] 
Aspen Ridge defended on the basis that it was not required to purchase Lot 27, but was 
only required to exercise its option, if at all, within 30 days after the sale of Lot 46 so that 
when Aspen Ridge did not exercise its option, the option was lost but Aspen Ridge did 
not breach the Option Agreement. [R. 30-32 & 430-31] Aspen Ridge also contended that 
even if it breached the Option Agreement, the Ivie Group had suffered no damages 
because Lot 27 was worth more than the option price of $750,000.00. [R. 1097 at 85:7-
88:7] 
The Ivie Group filed a Second Amended Complaint on October 8, 2003, shortly 
before the original discovery cutoff, in which the Ivie Group sought damages "in an 
amount equal to Lot 27!s option price ($750,000), plus the statutory interest on the 
$750,000 between the time the option should have been exercised up until plaintiff is able 
4 
to sell Lot 27, plus plaintiffs' costs associated with selling Lot 27, minus the amount that 
plaintiffs are able to obtain upon a sale of Lot 27." [R. 103 & 108] 
The original fact discovery deadline was October 16, 2003. At the Ivie Group's 
request, Aspen Ridge stipulated to extending that deadline for six weeks until December 
1,2003. [R. 116-119] 
Thereafter, the Ivie Group filed a motion to further extend the discovery cutoff as 
well as a motion to file a Third Amended Complaint to seek damages in the amount of the 
purchase price plus interest or, in the alternative, specific performance. [R. 130-131 & 
166-168 & 175-183] The court granted the Ivie Group a second extension of the fact 
discovery cutoff to January 9, 2004. [R. 527-529] The court denied the Ivie Group leave 
to file a Third Amended Complaint. [R. 575] 
The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment, arguing their 
respective positions on the meaning of paragraph 6 of the Option Agreement. [R. 184 & 
374] The court denied both motions, determining that the language of paragraph 6 was 
ambiguous as to whether Aspen Ridge was obligated to purchase Lot 27 and that the 
language would have to be interpreted by the jury at trial. [R. 543-544] 
On October 28, 2004, two weeks prior to trial, the Ivie Group once more sought 
permission to amend their Complaint to assert damages or an alternative claim for 
5 
specific performance. [R. 577-601] The court denied that motion. [R. 1095 at 60:2-22] 
The Ivie Group has not appealed that decision. 
The case was tried to a jury over three days commencing November 15, 2004. The 
jury rendered a verdict that Aspen Ridge had breached the Option Agreement by failing to 
purchase Lot 27 within 30 days after the sale of Lot 46. [R. 897-898] Aspen Ridge does 
not challenge that portion of the verdict on appeal. 
The jury awarded the Ivie Group $250,000 in general damages based upon the 
testimony of a 15% co-owner of Lot 27, Richard Buys ("Buys"), that in his opinion Lot 
27 was only worth $500,000.00 as of July 1, 2001, or $250,000 less than the option price 
of $750,000. [R. 897; R. 1096 at 30:1-7] The Ivie Group did not present any expert 
appraisal testimony despite the fact that Aspen Ridge's expert appraiser testified Lot 27 
was worth $1,220,000 based upon comparable sales of a number of Wolf Creek Ranch 
lots. There was no foundation for Buys's testimony. He had only visited the property 
once in 2003, two years after the valuation date. [R. 1096 at 25:5-7] Further, Buys 
testified in his deposition taken in October 2003, that he had no opinion of the value of 
Lot 27. [R. 1096 at 33:20-34:9] In addition, the Ivie Group stated under oath in answers 
to interrogatories served on December 1, 2003, that the fair market value of Lot 27 was 
irrelevant to their damage claim and they did not have any contention as to the fair market 
value of Lot 27 on July 1, 2001 or any other relevant date. [R. 1096 at 28:5-29:5] 
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Judgment was entered on the jury's verdict on December 1, 2004. [R. 951-953] 
The court awarded the Ivie Group pre-judgment interest at 10% per annum.1 [Id.] Aspen 
Ridge filed its Notice of Appeal on December 28, 2004. [R. 1010-1012] 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. Aspen Ridge is a Utah limited liability company and the original developer of 
the Wolf Creek Ranch development in Wasatch County, consisting of 84 lots containing 
160 acres each. [R. 1096 at 158:22-23 & 174:11-19] Wolf Creek Ranch contains 
approximately 14,000 acres which is a little over 20 square miles. [R. 1096 at 154:10-16] 
2. The Ivie Group owned 240 acres of raw land located adjacent to Wolf Creek 
Ranch. [Ex. 56; R. 1095 at 178:21-179:3] 
Breach of the Option Agreement 
3. On May 10, 2000, Aspen Ridge and the Ivie Group entered into an Exchange 
Agreement and an Option Agreement pursuant to which the Ivie Group exchanged its 240 
1
 The court also awarded attorney's fees. [R. 1040] The parties have stipulated that 
in the event the judgment is reversed on appeal, Aspen Ridge may file a motion in district 
court to set aside the attorney's fee award. [R. 1090-1094] If the judgment is reversed, the 
case should be remanded for the district court to determine whether Aspen Ridge should 
be awarded its attorney's fees as the prevailing party under Tfl3 of the Option Agreement 
and the amount of fees to be awarded. [Ex. 55] See R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 
11, 40 P.3d 1119; Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-556 
(UtahApp. 1989). 
7 
acres for Lot 27, Wolf Creek Ranch Plat 2A, which was a fully improved lot, and Aspen 
Ridge was given the right to repurchase Lot 27 for $750,000.00, in addition to a 
$150,000.00 payment made by Aspen Ridge to the Ivie Group for the option. [Exs. 55 & 
56] 
4. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Option Agreement, Aspen Ridge was required to 
exercise its option within three years or, if Lots 46 or 47 were sold during the option 
period, within 30 days after the closing of such a sale. [Ex. 55] 
5. On June 1, 2001, Aspen Ridge sold Lot 46 for $1,275,000. [Ex. 66A&B; R. 
1096 at 196:22-197:1; 214:1-7 & 225:2-4] 
6. The jury determined that Aspen Ridge breached the Option Agreement by not 
purchasing Lot 27 within 30 days after the sale of Lot 46. [R. 897-898] Aspen Ridge 
does not challenge that determination on this appeal. 
Damages 
Buys's Testimony on Value 
7. Appellee Buys owned an undivided 15% interest in Lot 27. [R. 1095 at 179:10-
12] At trial, over Aspen Ridge's objection, Buys was permitted to testify that as of July 1, 
2001, Lot 27 had a fair market value of $500,000.00. [R. 1096 at 15:1-30:7] However, he 
only saw Lot 27 on one occasion in the summer of 2003 (two years after the valuation 
date) when he walked the lot. [R. 1096 at 25:5-7 and 37:13-17] The supposed fair market 
8 
value that Buys testified to was substantially less than the improvement costs for each lot 
of between $700,000 to $900,000. [R. 1096 at 155:19-157:4] 
8. Buys' deposition was taken in this case on October 23, 2003 (after the one time 
he had seen Lot 27). At that time, he testified he had no opinion as to the fair market 
value of Lot 27: 
Q. At the time you put Lot 27 up for sale did you have an opinion as to the 
fair market value of Lot 27? 
A. No, I'm not in the real estate business. 
Q. As you sit here do you have an opinion on the value of Lot 27? 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. Do you know what the assessed market value is of Lot 27? 
A. No, I do not. [R. 1096 at 33:20-34:9] 
9. Moreover, in their December 1, 2003 responses to Aspen Ridge's First Set of 
Interrogatories served shortly before the end of the discovery cutoff as twice extended by 
the court, the Ivie Group responded to Interrogatory No. 3 by stating the fair market value 
of Lot 27 was irrelevant to their claim and they had no contention on value: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: State what you contend is the fair market 
value of Lot 27 as of June 1, 2001, as of February 2003, and as of any other 
date that you contend is relevant to your damage claim in this action. 
Identify each fact upon which you rely to support your contention as to the 
fair market value, identify each person who witnessed or otherwise has 
knowledge of such facts and identify each document relating in any manner 
to such facts. 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs object to Interrogatory No. 3 on the grounds that it 
seeks information that is not relevant to the claims or defenses of any party 
and/or are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
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evidence. Subject to and without waiving this objection, Plaintiffs answer 
this interrogatory as follows. 
Plaintiffs do not contend that the fair market value of Lot 27 is relevant 
to their damage claim. Therefore, Plaintiffs do not have any contention as 
to the fair market value of Lot 27 or [sic] any relevant dates. [R. 1096 at 
28:5-29:5 & 35:12-36:7] [Emphasis Added] 
10. The I vie Group never supplemented its interrogatory answer or in any way 
corrected or modified Buys' deposition to provide an opinion on fair market value. [R. 
1096 at 18:8-20] 
11. The only bases for Buys's opinion on value was that the Ivie Group had listed 
Lot 27 for over a year yet it had not sold; Aspen Ridge had attempted to sell Lot 27 for 
three years before that; and the physical appearance of a portion of the frontage of Lot 27 
was poor until remediated in the summer of 2003. [R. 1096 at 15:10-24:25] 
Evidence Concerning the Condition of Lot 27 
12. Each lot in Wolf Creek Ranch extended to the middle of the roadway. [R. 
1096 at 159:20-24] Aspen Ridge had a 300 foot wide construction easement over each 
lot for construction activities. [R. 1096 at 159:25-160:6 & Ex. 49, ^11.9] 
13. Lot 27, like 25-30 other lots, was used by Aspen Ridge as a staging area for 
construction activities beginning in 1999. [R. 1096 at 236:10-19; R. 1096 at 205:20-
206:4] 
14. On Buys's one and only visit to Lot 27 in the summer of 2003, Buys took 
pictures of the lot to document its condition. [R. 1095 at 7:17-19] The pictures accurately 
10 
reflected the condition of the portion of the lot that he photographed at that time. [R. 
1095 at 9:15-18] 
15. The pictures taken by Buys in 2003 showed that a large dirt berm existed on 
Lot 27 visible from the main road. There was also a pile of debris, including concrete 
blocks and refuse, that was visible from the main road. [R. 1096 at 11:13-12:23] 
16. Buys's pictures also showed a large hole had been excavated about 150-200 
feet from the road. This excavation had been mistakenly done in approximately August 
of 2003 by a subcontractor, Kaycie Simpson, who was supposed to have removed dirt 
from a lot across the road.2 When Aspen Ridge's Douglas Anderson found out that there 
had been excavating on Lot 27 for at most a day and a half, he immediately took action to 
stop that and move the equipment off of Lot 27 and across the road where it should have 
been. He immediately talked to Kaycie Simpson, and had him repair that damage. [R. 
1096 at 206:5-23 & 236:20-23] Anderson also hired Mr. Simpson's company to do 
reclamation work on Lot 27 to restore it to its original condition before it had been used 
as a staging area at a cost of $8,114.66. [R. 1096 at 207:3-209:3 & Ex. 42] This work 
2
 Excavations on Wolf Creek Ranch lots were not uncommon. [R. 1096 at 
205:17-19] There are about 25 to 30 lots that were used as staging areas adjacent to the 
roadway because 27 miles of road had to be built. The construction had been going on on 
a daily basis for years and was still going on at the time of trial. [R. 1096 at 205:20-
206:4] 
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was done in August or September, 2003, within a couple of weeks after the dirt was 
removed by Mr. Simpson. [Id at 206:7-23 & 236:14-19] 
17. The conditions shown in the photographic exhibits 72B 1 through 5 show the 
condition of Lot 27 continuously from 1999 until the reclamation work in August or 
September of 2003. [R. 1096 at 236:10-23] The berm had existed probably since 1999. 
[R. 1096 at 237:13-24] Similar berms existed on other lots in Wolf Creek, including a 
large berm next door on Lot 28, that did not preclude sale of the lots. [R. 1096 at 239:4-
10] At no time prior to the lawsuit being filed did anyone complain about the condition of 
Lot 27. [Id. at 239:14-19] 
18. The Ivie Group's real estate agent, Doug Tulloch, testified that Lot 27 looked 
very bad during the first few months that he was trying to sell it. [R. 1096 at 97:25-98:2] 
After the berm and debris were cleaned up, the lot looked fine. [R. 1096 at 107:5-13 & 
107:22-108:3] Exhibit 50 reflects the condition of Lot 27 with the regrowth after the 
reclamation work was done. [R. 1096 at 113:5-15] 
Listing of Lot 27 
19. Lot 27 was one of the many lots that Aspen Ridge had for sale. Aspen Ridge 
listed Lot 27 for three years before the Ivie Group listed it. [R. 1096 at 94:4-8] The Ivie 
Group listed Lot 27 for sale with Doug Tulloch beginning in approximately July of 2003 
for $850,000. [R. 1096 at 78:21-24 & 93:21-24] When Mr. Tulloch took the listing for 
12 
Lot 27, he was very much aware that it was a slow market for the type of lots that are in 
Wolf Creek and he discussed that with Mr. Ivie in discussing listing price. [R. 1096 at 
82:16-83:2] The Ivie Group wanted a 30-day listing, but Tulloch refused such a short 
listing. [R. 1096 at 79:4-12] 
20. Mr. Tulloch ran an ad in the Park Record [Ex. 28] that stated Lot 27 was 
offered at $850,000, which was $400,000 below market value. The ad exclaimed that Lot 
27 was an "unbelievable ranch value" and that "this is a once in a lifetime chance to own 
part of Utah's premier ranch property. All offers will be considered." [R. 1096 at 
208:13-25] He understood at the time that he an obligation to deal truthfully and honestly 
with the public. [R. 1096 at 84:8-85:3] Ivie was aware of the ad before it was placed. He 
did not object to the ad. [R. 1096 at 86:2-20 & Ex. 28] 
21. Mr. Tulloch ran another ad in the Park Record in August 2003. This ad stated 
"WOW! UNBELIEVABLE RANCH VALUE," that the price for the lot had been 
reduced to $799,000 and that Lot 27 was being offered at $451,000 below market value. 
[Ex. 31; R. 1096 at 88:10-22] 
22. On the Prudential Utah website, Mr. Tulloch put together a description of Lot 
27 stating that it had fantastic Timp views and was close to the Heber gate for small plane 
access, [R. 1096 at 90:23-91:5 & 93:3-8] 
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23. As of November 16, 2004, when Mr. Tulloch was testifying at trial, the listing 
price of Lot 27 had been increased back up to $850,000. [R. 1096 at 89:1-14] 
24. Tulloch testified that Will Lange, who was the real estate agent for Aspen 
Ridge, told Tulloch that Lot 27 was a "crappy lot" and one of the problems with the lot 
was you would have to build a $200,000 driveway to access the lot. [R. 1096 at 94:13-
22] 
25. Many lots in Wolf Creek Ranch required the same kind of expenditure for a 
driveway. [R. 1096 at 166:7-24] Mr. Tulloch was aware that other lots in Wolf Creek 
also required expensive driveways. On Lot 27, you would only have to build an 
expensive driveway so you could put the house where there would be a view. You could 
build an inexpensive driveway if the house were closer to the road. [R. 1096 at 110:5-15] 
26. Under the CC&Rs for Wolf Creek Ranch there is a 300 foot set back at a 
minimum and it is not uncommon to see long driveways of 2,000 or 3,000 feet. Some 
driveways are as long as 6,000 feet. It was the buyer's choice. [R. 1096 at 166:7-16] Lot 
27 would not require a long driveway. [Id. at 166:17-24] Lot 26 - - right next to Lot 27 - -
required a longer driveway. [R. 1096 at 175:16-20] Lot 26 sold for $1,175,000. [SOF No. 
32] 
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27. Mr. Tulloch testified he loved the views of Lot 27, that he would like more 
trees and that personally he thinks "it's a great lot for the price [$850,000]." [R. 1096 at 
107:16-20] 
28. As of the time of trial, Lot 27 (as well as approximately 30 other Wolf Creek 
Ranch lots) had not yet sold. [R. 1096 at 40:8-19 & 158:22-25] 
29. There are 84 lots in Wolf Creek Ranch of which 54 had sold at the time of 
trial. [R. 1096 at 158:22-25] The speed with which a property is sold does not affect fair 
market value. [R. 1096 at 149:13-15] The number of sales in Wolf Creek Ranch went 
down when the stock market took a large loss in March 2000 and then 9/11 occurred. 
The sales prices remained stable but the number of lots sold dropped. [R. 1096 at 196:7-
21] In the year prior to trial, lots had sold in Wolf Creek Ranch. Some of those lots had 
been for sale for five years. The sales prices had remained stable. On average the sales 
prices had increased. [R. 1096 at 209:11-19] 
30. Aspen Ridge sold Wolf Creek Ranch Lot 44 for $750,000 pursuant to a Real 
Estate Purchase Contract dated July 27, 2004, which closed in November 2004. [R. 1097 
at 8:16-9:2; 11:16-14:17; Exs. 77 & 78] Unlike Lot 27, Lot 44 had no asphalted roadway 
in front of it and the buyers would have to wait for some time for any improvements so it 
was an incomplete lot. In addition, the buyers agreed that the seller (an affiliate of Aspen 
Ridge) could build a large custom house for the buyers on the lot at a cost of in excess of 
15 
$5 Million. Mr. Anderson would not have agreed to sell Lot 44 for the reduced amount if 
the buyers had not hired his company to build their custom home. [Id. at 17:11-20:18] 
The day after Lot 44 closed, the sale of Lot 75 closed for $1,800,000. Lot 75 has a 
completed road in front of it. [Id. at 24:12-19] 
Aspen Ridge's Appraisal 
31. Aspen Ridge's real estate appraiser was Brad Foulger. He was a state certified 
general real estate appraiser, which is the highest rating for an appraiser in the State of 
Utah. That certification requires about 160 hours of course work as well as several years 
of background experience. [R. 1096 at 118:23-119:24] Mr. Foulger was a commercial 
real estate appraiser. Subdivisions such as Wolf Creek Ranch are considered commercial 
real estate. [R. 1096 at 120:4-19] 
32. Mr. Foulger considered a lot of comparable data to appraise Lot 27. Mr. 
Foulger testified that comparables do not usually get much better than the comparables 
available to him in this case. There were three lots on each side of Lot 27 that were all 
160 acres, the same size as Lot 27, that had been sold within about a year. [R. 1096 at 
124:8-21] 
33. Lot 26, which is adjacent to the east of Lot 27, sold seven months before the 
July 1, 2001 valuation date for $1,175,000.00. Lot 28, which is adjacent to Lot 27 on the 
west, sold for $1,220,000.00. Lots 26 and 28 are very comparable to Lot 27. [R. 1096 at 
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175:3-176:14] Other comparable lot sales included: Lot 38, which was 160 acres and sold 
for $1,290,000.00; Lot 25, a 160 acre lot two lots away from Lot 27, sold for 
$1,175,000.00; Lot 37, which was 160 acres, sold for $1,300,000.00; and Lot 6, which 
was 160 acres, sold for $1,250,000.00. [R. 1096 at 125:2-25] 
34. Based on those comparables, Mr. Foulger determined that the fair market 
value of Lot 27 as of July 1, 2001 was $1,220,000.00. [R. 1096 at 126:1-17] 
IV. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There was no substantial evidence to support the $250,000 damages awarded by 
the jury based upon Buys's testimony. The district court erred in permitting Buys to 
testify concerning the fair market value of Lot 27 because there was no foundation for his 
opinion other than the fact that he owned a 15% interest in Lot 27. He had only visited 
Lot 27 once in the summer of 2003, two years after the valuation date. In his deposition 
taken in October 2003, Buys testified that he was not in real estate and did not have an 
opinion on the value of Lot 27 or even know its assessed value. The information that 
Buys testified he relied upon that he learned after his deposition to attempt to support his 
opinion of value did not in fact support that opinion. The fact that Lot 27 had not sold 
(just as approximately 30 other lots had not yet sold) and that Lot 27 had been used for a 
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staging area for construction activities and it cost $8,114.66 to restore Lot 27 to its 
original condition, is not a basis upon which Buys could conclude that Lot 27 was worth 
approximately $700,000 less than the prices at which other adjacent lots had sold. Buys 
did not even rely on the condition of Lot 27 in his testimony to the jury. Indeed, the 
improvement costs of Lot 27 alone of $700,000 to $900,000 greatly exceeded Buys's fair 
market value figure. 
The district court also erred in permitting Buys to testify concerning the value of 
Lot 27 when the Ivie Group stated in their answer to Aspen Ridge's Interrogatory No. 3 
that the fair market value of Lot 27 was irrelevant to their damage claim and that they had 
no opinion as to the fair market value of Lot 27. That answer was never supplemented. 
Aspen Ridge was substantially prejudiced when the district court permitted Buys to give 
his surprise and totally unsubstantiated testimony on value at trial because Aspen Ridge 
had no opportunity to conduct discovery concerning that opinion or the basis therefor or 
to gather evidence to impeach that testimony and to properly cross-examine. 
Finally, the district court erred in awarding prejudgment interest because the 
amount of damages could not be calculated with mathematical accuracy. Buys's opinion 
of value was not based upon general appraisal principles or any known rule or standard of 
value, but was simply his bald conclusion, and was not given until trial. 
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V. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
JURY'S AWARD OF DAMAGES. 
1. The District Court Erred in Permitting Buys to Testify Concerning the 
Fair Market Value of Lot 27. 
The district court properly instructed the jury that the measure of damages was the 
difference, if any, between the option price and the fair market value of Lot 27 on July 1, 
2001, the date of breach. [R. 863] See, e.g., Terry v. Panek, 631 P.2d 896, 897 (Utah 
1981); Smith v. Warr, 564 P.2d 771, 772 (Utah 1977). The jury awarded damages based 
upon Buys's testimony that Lot 27 was only worth $500,000, or $250,000 less than the 
option price. 
The district court erred in permitting Buys to testify that the fair market value of 
Lot 27 was $500,000 for two reasons. First, there was a woeful lack of foundation for 
Buys's opinion concerning the fair market value of Lot 27. He was not a knowledgeable 
owner. Buys even testified in his deposition that he had no opinion as to the fair market 
value of Lot 27. Second, the I vie Group stated in their answers to Aspen Ridge's 
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interrogatories that the fair market value of Lot 27 was irrelevant to their damage claim 
and that they had no opinion as to fair market value of Lot 27. Neither the interrogatory 
answer nor the deposition testimony were ever changed, modified or supplemented. 
a. There Was No Foundation for Buys's Testimony. 
The district court permitted Buys to testify as to the fair market value of Lot 27 on 
the mistaken basis that any owner of property may testify as to its value. [R. 1096 at 
27:13-17] However, the Utah Supreme Court and this court have ruled that an owner can 
only testify on value if there is proper foundation for his or her opinion. In other words, 
only knowledgeable owners can testify on value. Utah State Road Comm 'n v. Johnson, 
550 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976); Utah State Road Comm n v. The Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d 888, 
891 (Utah 1975); Promax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 258 (Utah App. 
1997). 
In Steele Ranch, supra, a landowner had given his opinion of severance damages 
to land which greatly exceeded the value testified to by the expert witnesses. The court 
held that the owner's testimony was improper, observing: 
It is appreciated that it is often stated that an owner may testify to the 
value of his property. We have no doubt that this is generally a safe and 
proper rule. But it is also true that when general rules are applied to 
specific circumstances difficulties are ofttimes encountered. It takes but 
brief reflection to realize that a person may come into ownership of 
property by inheritance, or otherwise, who may not have any realistic idea 
of its value. If it should so appear, the evidence would have no probative 
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use and should be deemed incompetent; and this may be true in varying 
degrees, with a corresponding effect upon its credibility. 533 P.2d at 891. 
One year later, in Johnson, supra, the Supreme Court held that the trial court had 
improperly allowed a landowner to testify as to the fair market value of the land based 
upon what it was worth to him. The Supreme Court recognized that it had stated in prior 
cases that an owner of property is always entitled to testify as to its value in condemnation 
proceedings. However, the Supreme Court stated that the Washington Supreme Court's 
decision in State v. Larson, 338 P.2d 135 (Wash. 1959) set forth the trend of recent 
decisions and correctly set forth the law as follows: 
An owner of property may testify as to its value,. . . upon the assumption 
that he is particularly familiar with it and, because of his ownership, knows 
of the uses for which it is particularly adaptable. However, when, as here, 
the owner has not used his intimate experience with and knowledge of the 
land's uses as a basis for determining its fair market value, but has 
obviously determined it upon the application of an improper formula, his 
opinion fails to meet the test and, therefore, has no probative value. 550 
P.2d at 217-218. 
The Supreme Court in Johnson also quoted with approval Commonwealth, etc. v. 
Hopson, 396 S.W.2d 805 (Ken. 1965) that "the owner of real estate shall not be presumed 
adequately qualified to express an opinion of market values by reason of ownership 
alone." Finally, the Supreme Court quoted with approval Rotge v. Murphy, 198 S.W.2d 
932 (Tex. 1946) where an owner was not permitted to testify to the market value of lots 
because she "did not show herself to be sufficiently familiar with the cash market value of 
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these lots to qualify her to express an opinion as to their value, and therefore the court did 
not err in excluding her testimony as to the value of the lots." 550 P.2d at 218. 
In the case at bar, Appellee Steven Ivie testified that the Ivie Group only acquired 
title to Lot 27 as collateral for Aspen Ridge's obligation to pay the $750,000. [R. 1095 at 
118:24-119:15; 121:10-16] The Ivie Group contemplated that before the end of the option 
period Aspen Ridge would repurchase Lot 27 for the $750,000. Buys did not even see 
Lot 27 until the summer of 2003, three years after the Ivie Group acquired title. [SOF No. 
7] He only owned a 15% interest in the lot. There was no foundation that he had any 
knowledge of comparable lot sales or the value of lots in the area or the value of Lot 27. 
This is not a case where the landowner has intimate knowledge of his land and its uses 
and is therefore qualified to testify on value. This is a case where a small part owner of 
land knew very little about the land and had no opinion of its value until his opinion was 
needed at trial to salvage the case. Buys specifically testified in his deposition less than 
13 months before trial - - and after his one visit to the property - - that he was not in real 
estate and did not have an opinion as to the fair market value of Lot 27. [SOF No. 8] 
When Aspen Ridge objected to Buys testifying on value based upon his deposition 
testimony, the district court heard testimony from Buys outside the presence of the jury as 
to what basis he had for an opinion of value at trial when he testified he had no opinion of 
value in his deposition. [R. 1096 at 21:9-29:23] Buys testified that since giving his 
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deposition testimony he had learned the following information that enabled him to 
express an opinion at trial: (1) the Ivie Group had been attempting to market the property 
for over a year and had been unsuccessful in doing so [Id. at 21:16-25]; Buys had read 
Douglas Anderson's deposition testimony that Aspen Ridge had not sold Lot 27 for three 
years before that [Id. at 23:7-25]; and Buys had read Mr. Anderson's deposition testimony 
that Lot 27 had been used as a construction staging area since 1999. [Id. at 24:1-8] The 
court permitted Buys to testify on value because he was a 15% owner. [Id. at 27:3-18] 
Buys then testified before the jury that in his opinion Lot 27 had a fair market value as of 
July of 2001 in the amount of $500,000. [Id at 30:1-8] 
The facts that Buys testified he learned after his deposition did not provide any 
basis at all for his opinion Lot 27 was worth $500,000. The fact that Aspen Ridge did not 
sell Lot 27 for $1,200,000 during the time Aspen Ridge owned that property, or that the 
Ivie Group had not sold Lot 27 for its $850,000 listing price, or for the temporarily 
reduced listing price of $799,000, during the approximately 16 months the Ivie Group had 
listed the property prior to trial, is no evidence that Lot 27 was only worth $500,000. It 
takes time to sell real estate. When there is an 84 lot subdivision - - especially mountain 
recreational lots selling for well in excess of a million dollars - - it may well take years to 
sell all the lots. That does not mean that the first lots sold are worth more than the last 
lots sold. Indeed, it is a matter of common knowledge that the prices for lots in a 
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subdivision often increases as sales progress. At Wolf Creek Ranch, the prices remained 
stable over the years. Lots that sold during the year prior to trial that had been for sale for 
five years sold in the same price range as lots sold years earlier, and on average increased 
in price. [SOF No. 29] There was no evidence that lot prices in Wolf Creek Ranch had 
decreased or that any lot had sold for anywhere near the $500,000 value testified to by 
Buys.3 Beyond that, the valuation date was July 1, 2001, so Buys could not even properly 
take into account the period of time thereafter that Lot 27 had been for sale. 
The fact that a small portion of Lot 27 was used for construction staging activities 
(as were a number of other lots in Wolf Creek Ranch) does not provide any evidence that 
the value of Lot 27 was $700,000 less than adjacent lots that had sold in the $1,200,000 
range. Indeed, Lots 26 and 28 were right next door to Lot 27. Lot 26 sold for $1,175,000 
and Lot 28 - - which had a large dirt berm on it [R. 1096 at 239:4-10] - - sold for 
$1,220,000. The fact that Lot 27 had been used as a staging area could not possibly have 
reduced its value by $700,000 when the cost to remediate Lot 27 in 2003 was only 
$8,114.66 (paid by Aspen Ridge), after which the lot admittedly looked fine. [SOF No. 15 
3
 The Ivie Group may attempt to support the verdict by pointing to Tulloch's 
testimony, given over Aspen Ridge's objection, that some of the clients to whom Tulloch 
attempted to sell Lot 27 were offered better lots in Wolf Creek Ranch at cheaper prices. 
[R. 1096 at 104:8-13] This testimony was clearly hearsay and without foundation and the 
district court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. [Rule 802, Utah R. Evid.] 
In any event, it provides no support for Buys's valuation testimony and Buys did not even 
purport to rely on it. [SOF No. 11] 
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& 17]4 Moreover, in his testimony before the jury, Buys did not testify that the fact that 
Lot 27 had been used as a staging area was a basis for his opinion. [R. 1096 at 39:8-41:6] 
The speculative nature of, and lack of foundation for, Buys's newfound opinion 
of value is punctuated by: (1) the undisputed fact that the Ivie Group and its real estate 
agent touted in their advertising of Lot 27 that the listing price of $850,000 was $400,000 
below market value, that Lot 27 was an "unbelievable value" and a "once in a lifetime 
opportunity"; (2) the testimony of Aspen Ridge's expert that the value of Lot 27 was 
$1,220,000 based upon several comparable sales of Wolf Creek Ranch lots and that it is 
rare that an appraiser has such good comparables upon which to base his estimate of 
value, yet Buys did not base his testimony on any comparable lot sales or the value of any 
lots in the area5; (3) the fact that the improvement costs alone for lots in Wolf Creek 
Ranch ranged between $700,000 and $900,000 per lot - - well in excess of Buys's 
"valuation" [SOF No. 7]; (4) the fact that the Ivie Group intentionally chose not to put on 
appraisal testimony and attempted until trial to base their damages solely on the purchase 
4
 The dirt that Kaycie Simpson mistakenly excavated took from Lot 27 for a day 
and a half during the summer of 2003 is irrelevant to the value of the property as of the 
valuation date of July 1, 2001, two years earlier. Moreover, it is undisputed that the 
damage that Mr. Simpson mistakenly did to Lot 27 was promptly remediated. [SOF No. 
16] 
5
 In fact Lot 46 sold on June 1, 2001, one month before the valuation date, for 
$1,275,000. [SOF No. 5] 
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price Aspen Ridge agreed to pay without regard to the fair market value of Lot 27 [SOF 
No. 9] despite clear Utah law that the measure of damages is the difference between 
contract price and fair market value; and (5) the fact that at the outset of trial, the Ivie 
Group again asked the district court to permit them to amend to allege specific 
performance and to exclude any evidence of the fair market value of Lot 27 as irrelevant. 
[R. 1095 at 41:7-52:10; R. 631-644] 
There was simply no foundation for Buys's wholly speculative and conclusory 
testimony which placed the value of Lot 27 at $700,000 and more below what lots had 
actually sold for in Wolf Creek Ranch. He was simply not a knowledgeable owner by any 
stretch of the imagination. It is significant that of the 84 lots in Wolf Creek Ranch - - 54 
of which had sold [SOF No. 29] - - the Ivie Group did not put on any evidence that a 
single lot had sold for anywhere near the $500,000 value to which Buys testified. The 
only evidence of another lot sale that the Ivie Group presented was that Lot 44 sold in 
November 2004 for $750,000. The Ivie Group did not put on any evidence at all 
concerning the circumstances surrounding that sale. And, Buys did not purport to rely on 
this sale to support his opinion of value. In any event, a sale for $750,000 does not 
support a valuation of $500,000. In addition, Mr. Anderson testified without 
contradiction that Lot 44 did not have an asphalted roadway in front of it and the buyers 
would have to wait for some time for improvements and that the buyers agreed that Mr. 
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Anderson's company could build a large custom home on the lot for the buyers at a cost 
in excess of $5 Million. Mr. Anderson would not have sold Lot 44 for such a low price 
but for that contract. Moreover, the very day after Lot 44 sold, Lot 75 (which had an 
asphalted roadway for access) was sold for $1,800,000. [SOF No. 30] 
The district court committed clear error in applying the wrong legal standard to permitting 
Buys to testify just because he owned a 15% interest in Lot 27.6 
b. The District Court Erred in Permitting Buys to Ambush Aspen Ridge by 
Testifying in Contradiction to His Deposition Testimony and the Ivie Group's 
Interrogatory Answer That They Had No Opinion on Value. 
Not only did Buys and the other members of the Ivie Group all testify in their 
depositions that they had no opinion on the fair market value of Lot 27, but they repeated 
6
 The only other evidence at trial that the Ivie Group could possibly argue 
supported Buys's fair market value opinion was the testimony of their real estate agent, 
Douglas Tulloch, that Lot 27 looked bad until it was remediated in August or September 
of 2003 by Aspen Ridge (at a cost of $8,114.66) and that after that Lot 27 looked fine, 
and the pictures taken by Buys showing the large dirt berm and debris pile. [SOF Nos. 14, 
15 & 18] Mr. Tulloch also gave the hearsay testimony that Aspen Ridge's real estate 
agent, William Lange, had told him that Lot 27 was a "crappy" lot and would require a 
long driveway at a cost of $200,000. [SOF No. 24] Even if the jury believed this evidence 
and totally ignored the uncontradicted evidence that numerous other lots were used as 
staging areas and that a number of other lots required as long or longer driveways than 
Lot 27 [SOF No. 24], this evidence in no way supports a $500,000 valuation. In fact, 
Buys did not purport to rely upon Mr. Tulloch's testimony concerning driveways or the 
fact that Lot 27 was used as a staging area for his valuation. [SOF No. 11] 
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this testimony in a subsequent interrogatory answer. In December 2003, shortly before 
the extended discovery cutoff, the Ivie Group responded to Aspen Ridge's Interrogatory 
No. 3, which required that the Ivie Group set forth their contention as to the fair market 
value of Lot 27 as of June 1, 2001 or any other date that the Ivie Group contended was 
relevant to their damage claim, and to provide detailed information to support the Ivie 
Group's contention of value, including supporting facts, documents and witnesses. In 
response, the Ivie Group stated: 
Plaintiffs do not contend that the fair market value of Lot 27 is relevant 
to their damage claim. Therefore, Plaintiffs do not have any contention as 
to the fair market value of Lot 27 or [sic] any relevant dates. [SOF No. 9] 
This interrogatory answer was never supplemented in any way by the Ivie Group pursuant 
to Rule 26(e), U.R.C.P. 
Rule 37(f), U.R.C.P., provides the sanction for a failure to disclose information as 
required by Rule 26(a) or to supplement under Rule 26(e) as follows: 
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as 
required by Rule 26(a) or Rules 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to 
discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to 
use the witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure 
to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to 
disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court may order any 
other sanction, including payment of reasonable costs and attorney's fees, 
.. . and informing the jury of the failure to disclose. [Emphasis Added] 
The Ivie Group was clearly required to disclose either in its original answer to 
Interrogatory No. 3 or in supplementation their contention as to the fair market value of 
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Lot 27, the facts and documents supporting that contention and the identity of persons, 
including Buys, having knowledge of those facts. The I vie Group failed to disclose this 
information. Instead, the Ivie Group simply put Buys on the stand at trial to give his 
surprise and totally unsubstantiated testimony on his opinion of value. Aspen Ridge was 
substantially prejudiced by this surprise testimony because it had no opportunity to 
conduct discovery with respect to Buys's opinion of value and the basis therefor or to 
gather evidence to impeach his opinion and properly cross-examine him. The district 
court clearly abused its discretion in permitting the Ivie Group to ambush Aspen Ridge 
with this surprise testimony at trial.7 It is hard to imagine a more intentional and blatant 
violation of Rule 26 than occurred in the present case. The Ivie Group intentionally 
decided not to hire an appraiser, and intentionally made the strategic decision not to place 
a value on Lot 27, but to instead attempt to base their damages on the entire option price. 
When the Ivie Group finally faced the fact that they could prove no damages, they 
unsuccessfully attempted to amend to allege specific performance. Only when that failed 
did they have Buys give his surprise testimony. 
7
 The district court hinted that Aspen Ridge would not be unfairly surprised by 
allowing Buys to testify because Aspen Ridge had hired an expert appraiser to testify. [R. 
1096 at 29:11-19] This comment misses the point. Certainly, Aspen Ridge was properly 
prepared to prove the fair market value of Lot 27. What Aspen Ridge was not properly 
prepared to do was to impeach Buys's surprise testimony and effectively cross-examine 
him with respect to an opinion that was first given on the second day of trial. 
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In Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 924-925 (Utah App. 1989), this court held that 
the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing to admit evidence that had not been 
timely disclosed to the opposing party contrary to the court's instructions. 
Similarly, in Graham v. Wallace, 588 S.E.2d 267 (W.Va. 2003), the trial court 
excluded expert testimony on the proper way for a radiologist to perform an arthrogram 
because that opinion had not been disclosed prior to trial. The West Virginia Supreme 
Court affirmed the exclusion of that evidence, observing: 
. . . "One of the purposes of the discovery process under our Rules of Civil 
Procedure is to eliminate surprise. Trial by ambush is not contemplated by 
the Rules of Civil Procedure." The discovery process is the manner in 
which each party in a dispute learns what evidence the opposing party is 
planning to present at trial. Each party has a duty to disclose its evidence 
upon proper inquiry. The discovery rules are based on the belief that each 
party is more likely to get a fair hearing when it knows before hand what 
evidence the other party will present at trial. This allows for each party to 
respond to the other party's evidence, and it provides the jury with the best 
opportunity to hear and evaluate all of the relevant evidence, thus increasing 
the chances of a fair trial. 
. . . Therefore, we agree with Mr. Graham that he was unfairly surprised 
by Dr. Hurt's testimony, and that this testimony was irrelevant and 
prejudicial. Id. at 174. 
See also Perdue v. Gagnon Farms, Inc., 2003 MT 47 at ffi[15-18, 65 P.3d 570 (failure to 
supplement expert witness disclosure so that plaintiffs could formulate an effective trial 
strategy and prepare adequately for cross-examination constituted error.) 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST. 
Prejudgment interest may only be awarded by a trial court "if damages are 
calculable within a mathematical certainty." Lefavi v. Burtock, 2000 UT App. 5, ^}24, 994 
P.2d 817, 823. In Lefavi, this court explained that: 
For damages to be calculable with mathematical certainty, they must be 
ascertained "in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known 
standards of value, which the court or jury must follow in fixing the amount 
rather than be guided by their best judgment in assessing the amount to be 
allowed for past as well as for future injury, or for elements that cannot be 
measured by any fixed standards of value." Id., citing Price-Orem Inv. Co. 
v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475, 483 (Utah App. 1989). 
In Utah, courts have allowed prejudgment interest in contract actions "when the 
fact finder works with set numbers and percentages." [Id. at 25] Prejudgment interest is 
not allowed when the amount of damages is uncertain and must be ascertained by the fact 
finder. [Id.] See also Bjorkv. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977), cert 
denied 531 U.S. 930, 97 S. Ct. 2634 (1977); Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 
P.2d 171, 178 (Utah App. 1993); James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 
P.2d 665, 671 (Utah App. 1994). Whether a party is entitled to prejudgment interest is a 
question of law which this court reviews for correctness. James Constructors, Inc., 888 
P.2d at 671; Andreason, 848 P.2d at 177. 
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In Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, 82 P.3d 1064, the Supreme Court 
held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover prejudgment interest where his damages 
were based upon the fair market value of property as testified to by an appraiser using 
generally accepted principles of appraising. Smith is not applicable in the present case 
because here the Ivie Group's damages were supported only by the surprise testimony of 
Buys at trial that the fair market value of Lot 27 was $500,000. Buys did not base his 
opinion of value on any fixed rules or standards of value. He simply pulled his opinion 
out of the air. Until the jury determined that damages were $250,000 based upon Buys's 
testimony, the amount of damages was unknown, and was not calculable. Indeed, based 
upon the testimony of Aspen Ridge's appraiser and "known standards of value", the fair 
market value of Lot 27 was $1,220,000 and the Ivie Group suffered no damages. 
Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in awarding prejudgment interest. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the award of damages 
and prejudgment interest in favor of the Ivie Group should be reversed and the case 
remanded with directions to enter judgment that the Ivie Group is not entitled to recover 
damages, or is only entitled to recover nominal damages, and for the district court to 
determine whether the attorney's fee award to the Ivie Group should be set aside and 
attorney's fees awarded to Aspen Ridge as the prevailing party and the amount thereof. 
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JEFFEKSON W. GROSS 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT-COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE © W ¥ A H 
STEVEN G. IVIE, etal, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
ASPEN RIDGE RANCHES, LLC, etal, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
No. 030500115 
Judge Donald J. Eyre, Jr. 
TO THE MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Answer the following questions. Unless otherwise indicated, all questions are to be 
answered based on a preponderance of the evidence. At least six members of the jury must agree 
on the answer to each question although the same six jurors do not necessarily have to agree on 
each answer. 
QUESTION NO. 1: Did Aspen Ridge breach the Option Agreement it had with plaintiffs 
when it failed to purchase Lot 27 from Plaintiffs within thirty days following the closing on the 
sale of Lot 46? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
If you have answered the above question "Yes", then please proceed to the following 
question. If you have answered the above question "No", you will not answer the remaining 
question, but will simply sign the verdict. 
QUESTION NO. 2: If you answered Question 1, "Yes", what amount of damages, if any, 
are Plaintiffs entitled to recover from Aspen Ridge? 
Damages: $ 3&) fiOf) 
Dated this / 7 day of November, 2004. 
APPENDIX B 
PETER STIRBA (Bar No. 3118) 
GARY R. GUELKER (Bar No. 8474) 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN G. IVIE, et al, : JUDGMENT ON VERDICT 
Plaintiffs, : 
Civil No. 030500115 
v. : 
Judge Donald J. Eyre, Jr. 
ASPEN RIDGE RANCHES, L.L.C., : 
Defendant. : 
The trial of the above matter was held on November 15, 16 and 17, 2004, before 
the Honorable Donald J. Eyre, Jr., Judge, the plaintiffs, Steven G. Ivie, Wesley R. Sweat, Richard 
M. Buys, and Glen B. Van Wagoner (collectively "the plaintiffs"), appearing and being 
represented by their attorney, Peter Stirba, and the defendant, Aspen Ridge Ranches, L.L.C., 
("Aspen Ridge"), appearing and being represented by its attorney, Jefferson W. Gross. Evidence 
was received by the court and the case was submitted to the jury with instructions for the jury to 
answer questions put to them on Special Verdict pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 49(a). The jury 
returned a Special Verdict finding that Aspen Ridge breached the contract which was the subject 
matter of the lawsuit. The jury further found that plaintiffs sustained damages as a result of 
imm 
Aspen Ridge's breach and awarded plaintiffs damages in the sum of $250,000.00 The Court 
being fully advised in the premises, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and 
DECREED that plaintiffs recover from Aspen Ridge the sum of $250,000.00, together with 
interest accrued on this amount at the rate often percent since July 1, 2001, as provided by law, 
and plaintiffs'costs of action. i ^ 
DATED this _[ day of Nwemberr2004. 
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